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AVANGRID NETWORKS, INC. V. SECRETARY OF
STATE
Grady Hogan*
ABSTRACT
Citizen initiatives and referendums are important tools for participatory
democracy. Because initiatives often concern contentious public policy matters,
opponents of pending initiatives have at times turned to the courts to prevent
particular initiatives from appearing on upcoming ballots. Courts typically will
adjudicate such pre-election challenges when plaintiffs assert the proscribed
procedural requirements for voting on an initiative have not been met or when
plaintiffs allege an initiative’s subject-matter is outside the constitutionally
delineated scope of permissible initiative content. However, because of the ripeness
justiciability doctrine that requires a concrete, certain, and immediate legal problem,
courts generally will not adjudicate pre-election challenges that claim an initiative
would be substantively unconstitutional if enacted. Instead, courts reserve
adjudicating substantive challenges until after an election if voters approve the
initiative—i.e., when the controversy has become ripe for review. In Avangrid
Networks, Inc. v. Secretary of State, Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court held that a
pending initiative should be excluded from the November 2020 ballot because the
initiative sought to exercise authority beyond the legislative power conferred on the
electorate by the Maine Constitution. This Note argues the court’s analysis
improperly went beyond the limited question of whether the initiative sought to
exercise power that is specifically delegated to other authorities by the State
constitution and instead conducted a substantive review of the constitutionality of
the measure if it were to be enacted.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Secretary of State, the Law Court1 was presented
with the question of whether a pending ballot initiative—the proponents of which
had met the procedural requirements for inclusion on the November 2020 ballot—
should be excluded from the ballot because the proposed initiative fell outside of the
scope of permissible power conferred on the citizenry by the direct initiative
provision of the Maine Constitution.2 Courts typically do not allow challenges to the
substantive validity of pending ballot initiatives prior to elections for a variety of

*

J.D. Candidate, May 2022, University of Maine School of Law; B.A. in Environmental Studies, Bates
College, 2013. Thank you to Professor Jeff Thaler for his guidance with this Note and the Maine Law
Review editors and staff for their crucial edits.
1. Maine’s highest court, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, is referred to as the “Law Court”
when deciding cases in its appellate capacity. Supreme Judicial Court, STATE OF ME. JUD. BRANCH,
https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/supreme/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/3JVB-HT2K] (last
visited Apr. 22, 2021).
2. Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Sec’y of State, 2020 ME 109, ¶¶ 1, 5, 7, 10, 237 A.3d 882.
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reasons, including the justiciability doctrine of ripeness.3 The ripeness requirement,
which mandates that a case present a concrete, certain, and immediate legal problem,
is generally not met in the ballot initiative context because the initiative may not pass
at the ballot box.4 Yet courts do typically allow limited pre-election review of a
pending initiative when an initiative is challenged for violating subject-matter
restrictions placed on the initiative process by the state constitution or enacting
statute.5
In Avangrid Networks, the Law Court concluded a pending ballot initiative
should be excluded from the ballot in an upcoming election “because it exceeds the
scope of the legislative powers conferred” by the Maine Constitution. 6 However,
this decision was not reached through an evaluation of whether the initiative violated
subject-matter restrictions placed on the initiative power within the State
constitution. Instead, the Law Court conducted a substantive review of whether the
initiative would be constitutional if enacted.
This Note begins with a short overview of the origins of direct initiatives in the
United States and the State of Maine and then outlines the three general categories
of lawsuits challenging ballot initiatives before elections are held. The background
information leading to this case is then discussed, followed by an evaluation of the
Superior Court and Law Court decisions. This Note concludes with an argument that
the Law Court erred by conducting a subject-matter review of the proposed measure
that went beyond the limited question of whether the initiative sought to exercise
power that is specifically delegated to other authorities by the State constitution. In
doing so, the Law Court conducted a substantive review of the underlying
constitutionality of the measure if enacted, an analysis that should properly be
reserved for after the election—only if the initiative were to pass and the issue
become ripe.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Origins of Ballot Initiatives in the United States and the State of Maine
Government consultation of the populace for political matters began in the
United States at the nation’s founding, when Rhode Island submitted the United
States Constitution to a popular referendum. 7 Yet for more than a century following
the nation’s founding, no avenue existed for citizens to participate directly in the
legislative process at the state level.8 That began to change during the Populist
Movement in the 1890s when direct democracy became considered an important
legislative reform, and a call for “a system of direct legislation, through the initiative
and referendum, under proper constitutional safeguards” was included in the
3. James D. Gordon III. & David B. Magleby, Article: Pre-Election Jud. Rev. of Initiatives &
Referendums, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 298, 304-17 (1989).
4. See Wagner v. Sec’y of State, 663 A.2d 564, 567-68 (Me. 1995).
5. Gordon & Magleby, supra note 3, at 303, 313-17.
6. Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 38, 237 A.3d 882.
7. Gordon & Magleby, supra note 3, at 298.
8. See Initiative, Referendum and Recall, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 20, 2012),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/initiative-referendum-and-recall-overview.aspx
[https://perma.cc/G8WP-2MDG].
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People’s Party platform of 1896.9 In 1898, South Dakota became the first state to
adopt the initiative process as part of its state constitution.10 South Dakota’s lead
was followed closely by other states that added versions of the initiative process to
their constitutions, including: Utah in 1900, Oregon in 1902, Nevada in 1904, and
Oklahoma, which included an initiative provision in its founding constitution in
1907.11
In Maine in the early 1900s, there was a general frustration with the status of the
state’s economy, believed to be partially caused by the state government’s low tax
rates on timberlands and railroads.12 Observers in Maine looked to the adoption of
initiative procedures in the western states noted above, and began to view a policy
of direct legislation as a potential remedy for the state’s economic and governance
issues.13
A resolve to amend the State constitution to include a citizens’ initiative
procedure was first introduced to the Legislature in 1903 and was considered
thoroughly in the following legislative session in 1905.14 Although the proposal
generated significant support—enough to pass with a majority in both the House and
Senate—it failed to reach the two-thirds majority threshold necessary for
amendments to the State constitution.15 Yet support within Maine continued to grow
for the citizens’ initiative and referendum constitutional amendment and both major
political parties supported them in their party platforms the following election
season.16 During the next legislative session, the resolve was passed in both
legislative houses with the required two-thirds majority.17 In 1908, the constitutional
amendment was referred to the voters for final enactment and was approved by a
vote of 53,785 to 24,542, winning a majority in every county in the state. 18 The new
law became part of Maine’s constitution in 1909. 19
The amendment added seven sections to Article IV, part three of the Maine
Constitution,20 with two major provisions. The first aspect of the amendment deals
with the “people’s veto” which allows the electorate to conduct a referendum on any
act or resolve of the Legislature.21 The second aspect of the amendment authorizes
the people to propose any “bill, resolve, or resolution” which will be submitted to
the Legislature for consideration if the required number of signatures is met. 22 If the
9. People’s Party Platform Adopted at St. Louis, July 24, 1896, VASSAR COLL., http://projects.
vassar.edu/1896/peoplesplatform.html [https://perma.cc/A8WN-KEK9], (last visited Apr. 22, 2021); see
also Jeremy R. Fischer, Exercise the Power, Play by the Rules: Why Popular Exercise of Legislative
Power in Maine Should Be Constrained by Legislative Rules, 61 ME. L. REV. 503, 506 (2009).
10. Initiative, Referendum and Recall, supra note 8.
11. J. William Black, Maine’s Experience with the Initiative & Referendum, ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 159, 160-61 (1912).
12. Id. at 161-63.
13. Id. at 163-64.
14. Fischer, supra note 9, at 507.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Black, supra note 11, at 166.
19. Id.
20. Fischer, supra note 9, at 507.
21. Black, supra note 11, at 166-67.
22. Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18.
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Legislature declines to enact the proposed initiative, or if the proposed statute is
passed by the Legislature but vetoed by the governor, the bill will then be referred to
the electors to vote directly on whether the proposed initiative should be enacted. 23
The citizens’ initiative provision was used sparingly in the decades following
Maine’s constitutional amendment, for a total of seven initiatives over the course of
the first sixty years the option was available.24 However, use of the initiative process
in Maine ramped up starting in the 1970s.25 Associated with the initiative process’s
more frequent use in recent decades, several legal challenges have led the Law Court
to weigh in on the purpose of the citizens’ initiative provision and the appropriate
judicial review of such measures. The Law Court views the overall purpose of
citizens’ initiatives to be “the encouragement of participatory democracy.” 26 The
court has opined that through the constitutional amendment, “the people, as
sovereign, have retaken . . . the legislative power, and that a particular undertaking
by them to exercise that power shall be liberally construed to effectuate the
purpose.”27 The ability to exercise the legislative power is not a privilege but rather
a right. Citizens’ initiatives “cannot be said merely to permit the direct initiative of
legislation upon certain conditions. Rather, it reserves the people the right to
legislate by direct initiative if the constitutional conditions are satisfied.” 28
B. Pre-Election Challenges to Ballot Initiatives
Instances of pre-election challenges to ballot initiatives can be properly
distinguished into three broad categories: (1) challenges to the substance of the
measure alleging it would be invalid if enacted for conflicting with a paramount law;
(2) challenges based on an alleged failure to meet the constitutional or statutory
procedural requirements necessary to qualify for an election; and (3) challenges
alleging the subject-matter of the measure falls outside of the permissible scope for
an initiative.29
Most courts will not allow pre-election review of the substantive validity of a
measure for concerns regarding “issuing an advisory opinion, violat[ing] ripeness
requirements and the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional questions, and .
. . unwarranted judicial intrusion into a legislative process.” 30 Ripeness is a
justiciability doctrine that prevents “judicial entanglement in abstract disputes,
avoid[s] premature adjudication, and protect[s] agencies from judicial interference
until a decision with concrete effects has been made . . . .”31 For a case to be ripe,

23. Id.
24. Christine I. Dulac, Researching Initiatives & Referenda: A Guide for Maine, 26 LEGAL REF.
SERV. Q. 97, 100 (2007).
25. Id.
26. Allen v. Quinn, 459 A.2d 1098, 1102 (Me. 1983).
27. Op. of the Justices, 275 A.2d 800, 803 (Me. 1971). See also League of Women Voters v. Sec’y
of State, 683 A.2d 769, 771 (Me. 1996) (“When the people enact legislation by popular vote, we
construe the citizen initiative provisions of the Maine Constitution liberally in order to facilitate the
people’s exercise of their sovereign power to legislate.”)
28. McGee v. Sec’y of State, 2006 ME 50, ¶ 25, 896 A.2d 933.
29. Gordon & Magleby, supra note 3, at 302-03.
30. Id. at 304.
31. Johnson v. City of Augusta, 2006 ME 92, ¶ 7, 902 A.2d 855.
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“there must be a genuine controversy and a concrete, certain, and immediate legal
problem.”32 Speculative concerns about future hardships do not meet ripeness
requirements.33
Substantive challenges to ballot initiatives pre-election are generally not ripe for
review because the initiative may not be approved by the voters 34 and thus does not
present concrete, certain, and immediate legal problems. In Maine, the Law Court
has embraced the view that substantive challenges to ballot initiatives ought not be
adjudicated prior to an election for lack of ripeness because “[j]usticiability requires
that there be a real and substantive controversy based upon an existing set of facts,
‘not upon a state of facts that may or may not arise in the future.’” 35 Adjudicating
the substantive constitutionality of a ballot initiative pre-election is improper because
“the initiative may never become effective. Thus, [the court is] not presented with a
concrete, certain, or immediate legal problem.” 36
Conversely, courts generally do allow pre-election challenges regarding the
procedural requirements of the ballot initiative process—for example, the form of
the petition, minimum number of signatures, administrative deadlines, etc. 37 This
makes sense when procedural limitations are considered as jurisdictional limitations
because “government officials do not have jurisdiction to conduct an election on a
measure if these requirements have not been met, and thus the issue is immediately
justiciable.”38 Relatedly, without pre-election judicial review of procedural matters,
government officials overseeing the process could abuse their discretion and refuse
to perform their statutorily-mandated duties, which in the extreme could “completely
nullify the initiative and referendum processes.”39 The Law Court subscribes to the
view that procedural challenges are appropriate for pre-election review and has
weighed in on the procedural validity of ballot initiatives on numerous occasions. 40
The court adjudicated such a challenge in a separate proceeding concerning the
validity of petition signatures for the ballot initiative that is the subject of this Note. 41
Finally, courts generally allow pre-election challenges as to whether the subjectmatter of a ballot initiative is within the confines of what is allowed by state
constitutions.42 State constitutions or statutes authorizing ballot initiatives typically
require that initiatives do certain things, like propose constitutional amendments or
statutes. Some also explicitly prohibit ballot measures from addressing certain
32. Clark v. Hancock Cnty. Comm’rs, 2014 ME 33, ¶ 19, 87 A.3d 712 (quoting Marquis v. Town
of Kennebunk, 2011 ME 128, ¶ 18, 36 A.3d 861).
33. Id. at ¶ 20.
34. Gordon & Magleby, supra note 3, at 310.
35. Lockman v. Sec’y of State, 684 A.2d 415, 420 (Me. 1996) (quoting Connors v. Intern.
Harvester Credit Corp., 447 A.2d 822, 824 (Me.1982)); see also Wagner v. Sec’y of State, 663 A.2d
564, 567-68 (Me. 1995) (“Any determinations about the constitutionality of the initiative if enacted
would be premature at this time and more appropriately left for specific challenges in the future.”).
36. Wagner, 663 A.2d at 567.
37. Gordon & Magleby, supra note 3, at 313.
38. Id. at 314.
39. Id. at 315.
40. See Friends of Cong. Square Park v. City of Portland, 2014 ME 63, ¶ 1, 91 A.3d 601; Morris v.
Goss, 147 Me. 89, 90, 83 A.2d 556, 557-58 (1951).
41. Reed v. Sec’y of State, 2020 ME 57, ¶ 1, 232 A.3d 202.
42. Gordon & Magleby, supra note 3, at 313.
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topics, such as appropriations, administrative matters, the court system, or zoning. 43
A major rationale for adjudicating subject-matter challenges pre-election is similar
to that of procedural challenges, namely that the proponents of an initiative may not
have the right to make use of the initiative process at all.44 For subject-matter
challenges, “the factual controversy—whether these requirements are met—exists
before the election.”45 Prior to the Avangrid Networks ruling, the Law Court also
seemed to have endorsed this view, though with regard to the “people’s veto” rather
than the direct ballot initiative.46
C. The Public Utilities Commission and the New England Clean Energy Connect
Project
The Public Utilities Commission (hereinafter “the Commission”) regulates
electric, natural gas, telecommunications, and water utilities throughout Maine. 47
The Commission was created by Maine’s Legislature in 1913 to have experts
regulate and control all public service corporations in a way that would allow for
swifter and more equitable investigations of conditions, hearings of parties, and
grants of relief, than otherwise possible if the Legislature retained control. 48 In
creating the Commission, the Legislature delegated its entire authority to regulate
and control public utilities to the Commission.49 Among its many responsibilities,
the Commission is tasked, by statute, with approving the construction of new
transmission lines through the granting of a certificate of public convenience and
necessity.50 The statutes governing the Commission do not lay out comprehensive
guidelines for when a transmission line should be granted a certificate of public
convenience and necessity.51 However, the Commission has promulgated specific,
legislature-approved rules regarding the filing requirements and standards for
granting these certificates.52
In 2008, Massachusetts enacted legislation requiring electricity distribution
43. Id. at 303.
44. Id. at 314 (“The issue raised is not the hypothetical question whether the law, if passed, would
be constitutionally defective; rather, it is the present and ripe question whether the measure’s proponents
are entitled to invoke the direct legislation process at all. The case is concrete and specific, and the
record will not be improved by waiting until after the election to see how the law is applied in a specific
case.”).
45. Id.
46. See Morris, 147 Me. at 89, 93-94, 105-09, 83 A.2d at 556, 559, 565-67 (1951) (determining the
people’s veto was not available for emergency tax legislation because the Constitution exempted
emergency legislation from the referendum process); Moulton v. Scully, 111 Me. 428, 444-51, 89 A.
944, 952-55 (Me. 1914) (declining to delay a resolve of the Legislature removing the Sheriff of
Cumberland County because there was no need to allow for time for a petition for a people’s veto as the
impeachment power of the Legislature was beyond the scope of the people’s veto power).
47. About MPUC, ME. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, https://www.maine.gov/mpuc/about/index.shtml
[https://perma.cc/JLS3-EHDL] (last visited Apr. 22, 2021).
48. In re Searsport Water Co., 118 Me. 382, 108 A. 452, 457 (1919).
49. Mechanic Falls Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 381 A.2d 1080, 1090 (Me. 1977).
50. 35-A M.R.S.A. § 3132 (2019) (“[A] person may not construct any transmission line . . . unless
the commission has issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity approving construction.”).
51. Id. § 3121(6) (“In its order, the commission shall make specific findings with regard to the
public need for the proposed transmission line.”)
52. 65-407 C.M.R. ch. 330 (2012).
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companies to solicit and enter into long-term contracts for clean-energy generation.53
Central Maine Power and Hydro Renewable Energy, a United States affiliate of
Hydro-Quebec, submitted a bid for the New England Clean Energy Connect project
(NECEC).54 In 2017, Central Maine Power filed a petition with the Commission for
a certificate of public convenience and necessity in order to construct a 145.3 mile
transmission line from the Canadian border in Beattie Township to the city of
Lewiston.55
Extensive public comment and evidentiary hearings were held on the proposed
project between 2018 and early 2019.56 In May 2019, the Commission voted
unanimously to grant Central Maine Power a certificate of public convenience and
necessity for the NECEC project.57 NextEra Energy Resources, LLC, an opponent
of the newly approved transmission line, appealed the Commission’s decision to the
Law Court, which affirmed the Commission’s decision. 58 The court determined
sufficient evidence existed in the record to support the Commission’s decision, and
that proper procedure had been followed. 59
Following the Commission’s grant of the certificate of public convenience and
necessity, opponents of NECEC began gathering signatures for a citizens’ initiative
proposing a resolution that would require the Commission to amend its existing order
and deny the request for a certificate of public convenience and necessity.60 The text
of the initiative in question reads:
Sec. 1. Amend order. Resolved: That within 30 days of the effective date of this
resolve and pursuant to its authority under the Maine Revised Statutes, Title 35-A,
section 1321, the Public Utilities Commission shall amend “Order Granting
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity and Approving Stipulation,”
entered by the Public Utilities Commission on May 3, 2019 in Docket No. 201700232 for the New England Clean Energy Connect transmission project, referred to
in this resolve as “the NECEC transmission project.” The amended order must find
that the construction and operation of the NECEC transmission project are not in
the public interest and that there is not a public need for the NECEC transmission
project. There not being a public need, the amended order must deny the request
for a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the NECEC transmission
project.61

Proponents of the initiative challenging the transmission line submitted more
than the required number of signatures, and the Secretary of State determined the
initiative petition was valid.62 The Secretary of State’s verification of the ballot
initiative was unsuccessfully challenged in superior court and eventually affirmed by
the Law Court.63 The plaintiff in that case asserted the Secretary of State should
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

NextEra Energy Res., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2020 ME 34, ¶ 2, 227 A.3d 1117.
Id.
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶¶ 5-9.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶¶ 11, 43.
Id. ¶ 43.
Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Sec’y of State, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 5, 237 A.3d 882.
Id.
Reed v. Sec’y of State, 2020 ME 57, ¶ 10, 232 A.3d 202.
Id. ¶¶ 1, 8.
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have invalidated more of the initiative’s signatures, 64 a pre-election challenge that
fell squarely within the permissible procedural category discussed above.
D. Superior Court Decision
On May 12, 2020, shortly after the Law Court affirmed the Secretary of State’s
verification of the petition signatures, Central Maine Power’s parent company,
Avangrid Networks, LLC, filed a complaint against the Secretary of State. 65
Avangrid sought (1) “a declaratory judgment that the initiative exceed[ed] the scope
of the legislative powers reserved to the people,” among other claims, and (2) an
injunction to prevent “the Secretary from including the initiative on the November
3, 2020 ballot.”66 Industrial Energy Consumer Group, whose members are large
industrial energy consumers that obtain permits from the state,67 and the Maine State
Chamber of Commerce intervened as plaintiffs. 68 These plaintiffs, along with
Avangrid, argued that the initiative should not be submitted to the electors because
it exceeded the scope of the legislative power of the direct initiative provision by
usurping executive and judicial branch powers. 69
NextEra Energy Resources, LLC, along with Mainers for Local Power, a
political action committee funded by natural gas companies, 70 and nine Maine
citizens who stated they wished to vote for the initiative at the November election, 71
These defendants argued that the plaintiffs’
intervened as defendants.72
constitutional challenges were not ripe for judicial review before the election and
that because the required signatures were obtained, the initiative must be submitted
to the voters.73
The superior court dismissed the complaint, finding the plaintiffs’ challenges to
the initiative were substantive and not appropriate for pre-election review.74 The
court began by consulting Law Court decisions and the text of the initiative provision
within the Maine Constitution to note that, in general, “pre-election review is not
available to consider challenges to the validity of proposed initiative legislation if it
were to be enacted.”75 In the court’s view, the bar on pre-election review of the
substantive validity of proposed initiatives is consistent with the purpose of the direct
initiative provision within the Constitution: to encourage citizen participation in

64. Id. ¶ 1.
65. Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 7, 237 A.3d 882.
66. Id.
67. Brief for Appellant Industrial Energy Consumer Group at 3, Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Sec’y
of State, No. CV-20-206, 2006 Me. Super. LEXIS 90 (No. CUM-20-181), 2020 WL 6581246.
68. Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 1, 237 A.3d 882.
69. Id. ¶ 11.
70. Steve Mistler, Gas Companies to Spend $6M to Boost Opposition to CMP Transmission
Project, ME. PUB. (Jul. 16, 2020, 2:42 PM), https://www.mainepublic.org/post/gas-companies-spend6m-boost-opposition-cmp-transmission-project [https://perma.cc/6NZW-4ZVE].
71. Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Sec’y of State, No. CV-20-206, 2020 Me. Super. LEXIS 90, at *2,
n.1 (Jun. 29, 2020).
72. Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 7, 237 A.3d 882.
73. Avangrid Networks, 2020 Me. Super. LEXIS 90, at *2.
74. Id. at *13.
75. Id. at *8-9.
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democracy.76 The court acknowledged that Law Court decisions have indicated
there are instances in which limited pre-election judicial review is appropriate to
determine if the subject-matter of a proposed initiative is within the scope of the
people’s legislative authority.77 However, those Law Court decisions dealt with
proposed initiatives that conflicted with other procedural requirements within the
Maine Constitution, not with challenges to the substantive validity of the initiatives
if enacted.78
In its decision, the superior court recognized that the plaintiffs raised serious
separation of powers issues in that the initiative, if enacted, would overturn a single
executive branch agency order against the findings of that agency and the Law
Court’s affirmance of that order.79 But the court explained that these separation of
powers concerns merged with the plaintiffs’ principle argument that the initiative
was beyond the scope of the people’s legislative power. 80 Thus, the plaintiffs
actually asserted a substantive challenge to the validity of the initiative which was
only appropriate to review after the election if the initiative was passed by the
voters.81 The superior court therefore dismissed the complaint and the plaintiffs
promptly appealed the dismissal to the Law Court.82
III. LAW COURT DECISION
A. Summary of the Decision
The Law Court identified the narrow issue in the case as “whether the proposed
citizens’ initiative falls within the scope of the citizens’ constitutional power to
legislate” as created by Article IV, Part 3, Section 18 of the Maine Constitution. 83
The court ultimately answered this question in the negative, concluding that the
initiative would improperly interfere with an executive agency’s adjudicatory power
and thus was beyond the scope of the people’s power to initiate legislation. 84 To
reach this conclusion, the court first considered the appropriateness of pre-election
review of initiatives generally.85 Then, it turned its focus to the subject-matter of the
initiative at issue and examined separation of powers principles, the legislative
character of the citizens’ initiative constitutional provision, and the nature of the
powers held by the Public Utilities Commission. 86
In evaluating pre-election review of initiatives, the court first reiterated the
superior court’s view that the constitutionality of the substance of a proposed
initiative is not ripe for judicial review pre-election.87 Legal challenges of this sort
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at *9.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *8-9.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *10-11.
Id. at *11-12.
Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Sec’y of State, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 1, 237 A.3d 882.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶¶ 35-38.
Id. ¶¶ 16-22.
Id. ¶¶ 23-35.
Id. ¶ 16.
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are not ripe because there is no “concrete, certain, or immediate legal problem,” as
the initiative may not be enacted.88 Relatedly, the court pointed to multiple “Opinion
of the Justices”89 indicating that initiatives proposing substantively unconstitutional
bills are not subject to pre-election judicial review because of the mandatory
language within the Constitution that an initiative “shall be submitted to the
electors.”90 Conversely, the court noted that challenges as to whether an initiative
has met procedural requirements are appropriate for pre-election review.91 The court
previously reviewed such a procedural challenge regarding the validity of the
petition process for the initiative at issue in this case. 92
Similarly, the court determined that challenges asserting an initiative is outside
of the permissible subject-matter of the citizen’s initiative power are also reviewable
pre-election.93 The court looked to Wagner v. Secretary of State, a case where
opponents of a pending ballot initiative asserted that the initiative was beyond the
scope of the initiative power because it proposed a constitutional amendment, not
legislation, and that the bill would be substantively unconstitutional if enacted. 94 The
court in Wagner addressed whether the pending initiative actually proposed a
constitutional amendment.95 After determining it did not, the court stopped short of
deciding the second question because the issue of whether the bill would be
substantively unconstitutional if enacted was not ripe for review. 96 Thus, Wagner
illustrated for the Avangrid court that judicial review of the subject-matter of a
pending initiative, in order to determine if the proposed bill is within the scope of
Section 18 power, is ripe for review pre-election.97 After answering this threshold
question, the court turned its analysis to the nature of the initiative power and the
character of the initiative in this case.
The court began this analysis by briefly outlining the constitutional imperative
of separation of powers among the three branches of government. 98 In doing so, the
court framed the central question as “whether the initiative proposes an act that is
88. Id. ¶ 16 (quoting Wagner v. Sec’y of State, 633 A.2d 564, 567 (Me. 1995)); see also Lockman
v. Sec’y of State, 684 A.2d 415, 420 (Me. 1996) (“Justiciability requires that there be real and
substantial controversy based upon an existing set of facts, not upon a state of facts that may or may not
arise in the future.”).
89. Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 17, 237 A.3d 882. Either branch of the Legislature and the
Governor can request the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court to offer a non-binding opinion on
important questions of law. See Me. Const. art. VI, § 3; Op. of the Justices, 673 A.2d 693, 695 (Me.
1996).
90. Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 17, 237 A.3d 882 (quoting Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18,
cl. 2); see Op. of the Justices, 673 A.2d at 697, 698; Op. of the Justices, 623 A.2d 1258, 1264 (Me.
1993).
91. Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 18, 237 A.3d 882.
92. Id.; see also Reed v. Sec’y of State, 2020 ME 57, ¶ 1, 232 A.3d 202.
93. Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 22, 237 A.3d 882.
94. Id. ¶ 21 (citing Wagner v. Sec’y of State, 633 A.2d 564, 566-67 (Me. 1995)).
95. Wagner, 633 A.2d at 567.
96. Id. at 567-68.
97. Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 22, 237 A.3d 882; see also Gordon & Magleby, supra
note 3, at 314 (“Procedural and subject matter requirements could be viewed as jurisdictional
limitations; government officials do not have jurisdiction to conduct an election on a measure if these
requirements have not been met, and this issue is immediately justiciable.”)
98. Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 24, 237 A.3d 882.
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not legislative and is therefore not within the people’s right to initiate legislation.” 99
The court then explained how the initiative power is legislative in nature. Tellingly,
the initiative provision itself is situated in part 3 of Article IV, the title of which is
“Legislative Power.”100 Further, the direct initiative provision is titled, “Direct
initiative of legislation.”101 The text of Section 18 authorizes electors to propose any
“bill, resolve, or resolution.” 102 Although the provision uses the terms “bill, resolve,
or resolution” rather than “legislation,” the Law Court has previously construed these
terms to be legislative acts that “hav[e] the force of law.” 103
The court then pointed to examples where it previously advised certain topics
were not within the power of electors to initiate.104 These examples include a 1963
Opinion of the Justices that advised that citizens cannot initiate the issuance of
bonds105 and a 1996 Opinion of the Justices that advised that citizens cannot initiate
a de facto amendment to the United States Constitution. 106 Further, in Moulton v.
Scully, the court determined the people’s veto power could not be used to check the
Legislature’s impeachment power, because the impeachment power is separate and
distinct from the Legislature’s lawmaking power, which is subject to the people’s
veto.107
To complete its analysis of whether the subject-matter of the proposed initiative
was within the permissible scope of Section 18 legislative power, the court turned to
the power held by the Public Utilities Commission.108 The court reasoned that
regulation of public utilities is within the exclusive authority of the Legislature, 109
and the Legislature “delegated its entire authority over [that regulation] to the
Commission.”110 While the Commission exercises its legislative power when
rulemaking as an executive agency, the Commission also has an adjudicatory role in
executing the law.111 “A basic tenet of administrative law is that rulemaking is a
quasi-legislative act, and that adjudication is a quasi-judicial act.”112 The
Commission acts in its quasi-judicial executive capacity when it holds hearings and
issues a decision on an application for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity.113 Final adjudicatory decisions are subject to judicial review, rather than

99. Id.; Me. Const. art. III.
100. Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 27, 237 A.3d 882; Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3.
101. Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 27, 237 A.3d 882; Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18.
102. Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18.
103. Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 26, 237 A.3d 882 (quoting Moulton v. Scully, 111 Me.
428, 448, 89 A. 944 (1914)).
104. Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 28, 237 A.3d 882.
105. Op. of the Justices, 159 Me. 209, 214-15, 191 A.2d 357, 359 (1963).
106. Op. of the Justices, 673 A.2d 693, 697 (Me. 1996).
107. Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 29, 237 A.3d 882 (citing Moulton, 111 Me. at 447-51, 89
A. at 944).
108. Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 32, 237 A.3d 882.
109. Auburn Water Dist. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 156 Me. 222, 225, 163 A.2d 743, 744 (1960).
110. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 470 A.2d 772, 778 (Me. 1984).
111. Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 33, 237 A.3d 882 (citing 35-A M.R.S.A. §§ 104, 13011323 (2020)).
112. Id. ¶ 33 (quoting Forest Ecology Network v. Land Use Regul. Comm’n, 2012 ME 36, ¶ 45
n.11, 39 A.3d 74).
113. Id. ¶ 34 (citing 35-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1304, 3132(2), (6) (2020)).
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legislative review, in that they can be appealed directly to the Law Court. 114
The court ultimately concluded the initiative should not be placed on the
November ballot because the proposed initiative was not legislation.115 The court
reasoned the proposed initiative is “not legislative in nature because its purpose and
effect is to dictate the Commission’s exercise of its quasi-judicial executive-agency
function.”116 While the Legislature can place constraints on how the Commission
exercises its legislative functions, “the Legislature would exceed its legislative
powers if it were to require the Commission to vacate and reverse a particular
administrative decision the Commission has made.” 117 In short, the court concluded
that the initiative was actually seeking to mandate an executive action, not a
legislative action, and thus the constitutional prerequisite requiring an initiative to
propose a “bill, resolve, or resolution” had not been met. 118 Accordingly, the court
remanded the case to the “Superior Court to enter a declaratory judgment that the
initiative fails to meet the constitutional requirements for inclusion on the ballot
because it exceeds the scope of the legislative powers conferred by Article IV, Part
3, Section 18 of the Maine Constitution.” 119
B. The Law Court Should Have Reserved Substantive Review for After the Election
(If the Issue Then Became Ripe)
In Avangrid, the Law Court correctly recognized the three general categories of
lawsuits challenging ballot initiatives and referendums pre-election, as articulated by
Gordon and Magleby.120 While substantive challenges to the validity of an initiative,
if enacted, must wait until after the election, questions of whether an initiative has
met procedural or subject-matter requirements are appropriate for pre-election
judicial review.121 As Gordon and Magleby articulate, procedural and subject-matter
challenges do not involve the same justiciability issues that substantive challenges
do, and can be understood as jurisdictional limitations on government officials. 122
“[G]overnment officials do not have jurisdiction to conduct an election on a measure
if these [procedural and subject-matter] requirements have not been met, and this
issue is immediately justiciable.”123
Yet, Law Court guidance up until this decision suggests that the appropriate
review for subject-matter challenges is more limited than the review the Law Court
undertook in Avangrid. Prior rulings and opinions indicate that a proposed initiative
should only be invalidated in a subject-matter challenge when the initiative explicitly

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. ¶ 34 (citing 35-A M.R.S.A. § 1320(1) (2020)).
Id. ¶ 37.
Id. ¶ 35.
Id. ¶ 35.
Id. ¶¶ 35, 37.
Id. ¶ 38.
Gordon & Magleby, supra note 3, at 302-03.
Avangrid Networks, 2020 ME 109, ¶¶ 16, 18, 22, 237 A.3d 882.
Gordon & Magleby, supra note 3, at 314.
Id.
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clashes with specific other provisions in the Maine or Federal Constitutions. 124
However, in Avangrid, the Law Court’s analysis of the powers of the Public
Utilities Commission and whether the Legislature would have the power to enact this
type of measure goes too far. Although the court asserted that it conducted a subjectmatter review to determine whether the initiative fell within the scope of the people’s
initiative power, the court actually conducted a substantive review of the
constitutionality of the proposed bill if enacted. This type of substantive review is
not proper pre-election as it implicates the doctrine against advisory opinions,
unnecessarily draws the courts into contentious political disputes, requires courts to
rule on issues not yet ripe, and restricts the electorate’s ability to express popular
opinion.125 Instead, the Law Court should have applied its previous decisions in
Wagner v. Secretary of State, Morris v. Goss, and Moulton v. Scully, as guiding cases
for determining the appropriate scope of pre-election subject-matter challenges.126
In Wagner v. Secretary of State, the plaintiffs, opponents of a pending ballot
initiative, asserted that the initiative was an attempt to amend the Maine Constitution
and that it would be unconstitutional if enacted. 127 The initiative provision within
the Maine Constitution explicitly prohibits use of the initiative process to amend the
state constitution.128 The court determined that “the proposed initiative legislation
does not present us with a subject-matter beyond the electorate’s grant of
authority.”129 The court reached this result because, “on its face, the proposed
initiative legislation is not a constitutional amendment. It identifies itself as a
statutory enactment.”130 The court then declined to evaluate the constitutionality of
the initiative if enacted because that question was not ripe for consideration. 131
Inherent in this decision is the premise that if the initiative was, on its face, a
constitutional amendment, the court would have stepped in to invalidate it as
violating the subject-matter restriction contained within Section 18.
Furthermore, in Morris v. Goss, the Law Court determined that the people’s veto
provision of the Constitution cannot be used to nullify emergency legislation passed
by the legislature.132 In that case, opponents of a newly passed piece of emergency
legislation sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to accept
petitions invoking the people’s veto. 133 The Maine Constitution provides that acts
of the Legislature shall not take effect until ninety days after the recess of the session
in which they are passed.134 Importantly, however, “emergency bills” are not subject

124. See, e.g., Wagner v. Sec’y of State, 663 A.2d 564 (Me. 1995); Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 83
A.2d 556 (1951); Moulton v. Scully, 111 Me. 428, 89 A. 944 (1914).
125. Gordon & Magleby, supra note 3, at 304-12.
126. Wagner v. Sec’y of State, 663 A.2d 564 (Me. 1995); Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 83 A.2d 556
(1951); Moulton v. Scully, 111 Me. 428, 89 A. 944 (1914).
127. Id. at 566-67.
128. Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18 (“The electors may propose . . . any bill, resolve or resolution . . .
but not an amendment to the State Constitution . . . .”).
129. Wagner, 663 A.2d at 567.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 567-68.
132. Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 110, 83 A.2d 556, 567 (1951).
133. Id. at 90, 83 A.2d 557-58.
134. Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 16.
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to the ninety-day waiting period.135 The ninety-day window is critical for the
exercise of the people’s veto because petitions to initiate such a referendum must be
submitted to the Secretary of State within that timeframe.136 In Morris, the court
determined that the Legislature made appropriate use of emergency legislation, and
that the legislation would not have to wait ninety days to go into effect, and thus that
emergency legislation is not subject to the people’s veto.137
Finally, in Moulton v. Scully, the court considered a similar question of whether
the Legislature’s impeachment authority is subject to the people’s veto after the
Legislature passed a “resolution” initiating impeachment proceedings for the Sheriff
of Cumberland County.138 The court answered this question in the negative.139 It
reached this conclusion by distinguishing the lawmaking power of the Legislature as
defined by Article IV of the Constitution from the Legislature’s impeachment
authority, “powers somewhat akin to those of a judicial tribunal,” contained in a
different portion of the Constitution, Article IX, Section 5.140 The court noted the
measure passed by the Legislature was
in no sense a legislative act, as a law nor a proposed law, but was rather in the nature
of a complaint in a criminal proceeding. It was the first step in setting in motion the
machinery of removal, and in exercise of an extraordinary power . . . entirely apart
from the ordinary powers of legislation . . . .141

The court further reasoned that if the impeachment authority contained within
Article IX were subject to the people’s veto power from Article IV, it would
“effectually deprive the Legislature of the power thereby expressly conferred,
because if no resolve of this nature can take effect until the expiration of at least
ninety days after adjournment . . . the Legislature . . . would then have ceased to be
in session and no trial could be had at all.”142
In addition to the above rulings concerning the scope of the people’s initiative
and referendum powers, the Legislature has propounded similar questions to the Law
Court.143 While these opinions are not binding precedent of the court, 144 they are
instructive of the court’s view on referendum and initiative power. In 1963, the
Legislature asked the court whether the citizen’s initiative could be used to initiate
the issuance of bonds.145 To answer this question, the court looked to Article IX,
Section 14, the portion of the Constitution governing issuance of bonds, and
determined that the Section “effectively intervenes to prevent the submission to
referendum of a proposal of a bill for the issuance of bonds.” 146 Similarly, in 1996,
135. Id.
136. Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 17.
137. Morris, 147 Me. at 110, 83 A.2d at 567.
138. Moulton v. Scully, 111 Me. 428, 431-33, 89 A. 944, 946-47 (1914).
139. Id. at 446-47, 89 A. at 953.
140. Id. at 447, 89 A. at 953.
141. Id. at 449, 89 A. at 954.
142. Id.
143. See generally Op. of the Justices, 673 A.2d 693 (Me. 1996); Op. of the Justices, 159 Me. 209,
191 A.2d 357 (1963).
144. See generally Op. of the Justices, 673 A.2d at 695.
145. Op. of the Justices, 159 Me. at 214, A.2d at 359.
146. Id. at 215, 191 A.2d at 360.
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the Legislature asked the court whether electors, through the citizens’ initiative
provision, can direct the Legislature to make an application to the United States
Congress for a constitutional convention. 147 The court said no, responding that
Article V of the U.S. Constitution “specifically reserves the power to propose
amendments to Congress and the state legislatures.”148
The cases and opinions detailed above all stand for the same proposition—that
the people’s veto and citizens’ initiative powers do not extend to subject-matters that
are specifically conferred to other actors by the Maine or United States Constitutions.
In Wagner, the limitation against use of initiatives for state constitutional
amendments was contained within the citizen’s initiative provision itself. 149 In
Morris, the limitation preventing use of the people’s veto on emergency legislation
came from the constitution’s exemption of emergency legislation from the ninetyday waiting period.150 In Moulton, the constraint on use of the people’s veto to check
the Legislature’s impeachment authority came from the constitution’s separate grant
of impeachment power in Article IX and its inherent incompatibility with the
people’s veto provision in Article IV.151 Similarly, although not binding precedent,
the Law Court has advised that Article IX’s governance of issuing bonds precludes
the electors from doing so using Article IV initiative power,152 and that Article V of
the United States Constitution prevents electors from using the citizens’ initiative
provision to propose amendments to the United States Constitution. 153 Whether it
be for bonds, state or federal constitutional amendments, impeachment or otherwise,
a power is beyond the appropriate subject-matter of a people’s veto or citizens’
initiative if it is expressly conferred elsewhere within the state or federal constitution.
Yet in Avangrid, the subject-matter of the proposed initiative, directing the
Public Utilities Commission to find NECEC is not in the public interest and to deny
a certificate of public convenience and necessity, is plainly not a power allocated to
other authorities within the Maine Constitution. The subject-matter of the proposed
initiative is not, “on its face,” outside the scope of the direct initiative power. 154 To
get around this and reach its final result in the case, the Law Court analyzed whether
the initiative sought to exercise power that was sufficiently legislative in nature. 155
After evaluating the power and nature of the Public Utilities Commission, the court
reasoned that directing a new outcome that overturns an agency’s quasi-judicial
executive branch final decision, is not a use of legislative power and thus outside the
permissible realm of citizens’ initiative subject-matter.156 But, in conducting such
an analysis, the court goes beyond a limited review of the subject-matter of the
initiative, and instead conducts a substantive review of the constitutionality of the
proposed measure if it were to be enacted. In determining whether the proposed

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Op. of the Justices, 673 A.2d at 697.
Id.
See Wagner v. Sec’y of State, 663 A.2d 564 (Me. 1995); Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18.
Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 110, 83 A.2d 556, 567 (1951).
Moulton v. Scully, 111 Me. 428, 449, 89 A. 944, 953-54 (1914).
Op. of the Justices, 159 Me. 209, 215, 191 A.2d 357, 360 (1963).
Op. of the Justices, 673 A.2d 693, 697 (Me. 1996).
Wagner v. Sec’y of State, 663 A.2d 564, 567 (Me. 1995).
Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Sec’y of State, 2020 ME 109, ¶¶ 22-35, 237 A.3d 882.
Id. ¶ 35.
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resolve is legislation, the court is essentially determining whether it would be
constitutional for the Legislature to pass such a bill, a determination the court would
not be able to conduct before such a bill were enacted.
Unless called upon to do so in a “solemn occasion,” the judicial branch
categorically does not pass judgment on or invalidate bills pending before the
Legislature.157
To express a view as to the future effect and application of proposed legislation
would involve the Justices at least indirectly in the legislative process. The
separation of powers mandated by article III, section 2, of the Maine Constitution
requires that we avoid any such intrusion on the functions of other branches of
government. The question of the effect of a statute and its future application is not
within the constitutional power of the Justices . . . .158

The citizen’s initiative power is “simply a popular means of exercising the
plenary legislative power.”159 Yet the Avangrid court invalidated the substance of a
proposed initiative in a way it would be prohibited from doing if the initiative were
a regular bill being considered by the Legislature.
In 2019, the Legislature enacted a similar, though not identical, resolve in which
it directed the Public Utilities Commission to approve a contract for the Aqua Ventus
offshore wind project.160 The Aqua Ventus resolve did not involve the exact
separation of powers concerns at issue in Avangrid, because the Commission had not
already issued a final judgment that the Legislature was seeking to overturn.
However, if the Commission had issued a final decision, and the Legislature sought
to direct the Commission to overturn it as the ballot initiative at issue in this case
would, the judicial branch could not invalidate such a resolution until after it had
been enacted. In such a scenario, the Legislature may well have been
unconstitutionally usurping power of the executive or judicial branch, but the courts
would not be able to reach that determination until the issue was ripe for review after
the resolution was passed.
Prior Law Court guidance lends strong support to the notion that, although
citizens’ initiatives should be subject to pre-election judicial review considering their
subject-matter, an initiative should only be invalidated if it seeks to exercise power
in a way plainly inconsistent with the Maine Constitution because that power is
expressly conferred on other authorities. In Avangrid, the court expands the scope
of pre-election subject-matter review of initiatives and effectively conducts a
substantive review of the constitutionality of the proposed measure if enacted.
Courts would not conduct such an analysis of a bill pending before the Legislature
and should not do so for measures proposed through the citizens’ initiative provision.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note argues the Law Court erred in its analysis that the proposed initiative
was not sufficiently legislative to fall within the permissible subject-matter of the

157.
158.
159.
160.

See Me. Const. art. III, §§ 1, 2; Op. of the Justices, 2017 ME 100, ¶¶ 11-15, 162 A.3d 188.
Op. of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 611 (Me. 1981).
League of Women Voters v. Sec’y of State, 683 A.2d 769, 771 (Me. 1996).
Resolves 2019, ch. 87.
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citizens’ initiative provision of the Maine Constitution. This Note does not assert
that the resolve would be substantively constitutional if passed by the legislators.
Indeed, as discussed in the superior court decision, the plaintiffs raised valid
separation of powers concerns that could certainly lead a court to deem the resolve
unconstitutional.161 But, that determination should be reserved for after the election
when the controversy becomes ripe for review, if the electors vote the measure into
effect. This decision by the Law Court may lead to more pre-election litigation
challenging the subject-matter of pending initiatives. If so, it is possible the court
will follow the precedent set in this case and conduct analyses that are akin to a
substantive constitutional review of the measure if it were to be enacted. Such
decisions may well invalidate more initiatives pre-election and deprive the electors
of the opportunity to weigh-in on important policy issues. Such a result would
frustrate “the broad purpose of the direct initiative . . . the encouragement of
participatory democracy.”162

161. Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Sec’y of State, No. CV-20-206, 2020 Me. Super. LEXIS 90, at *1011 (Jun. 29, 2020).
162. Allen v. Quinn, 459 A.2d 1098, 1102 (Me. 1984).

